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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MICHAEL BAUM d/b/a
BAUMWEAR BY MICHAEL BAUM,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 20493

DEAN KNIGHT, d/b/a
THE FASHION CORNER,
Defendant-Appellant,
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT DEAN KNIGHT
d/b/a THE FASHION CORNER
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Was Mark Grayson an agent of Baum or of Knight?

2.

Did Mark Grayson have apparent authority from

Baum to receive notice from Knight of the rejection of the
goods?
3.

Did Knight give Baum timely notice of his

rejection of the goods under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-602(l)?
4.

Was Knight entitled to reject the goods as

failing to conform to the contract under Utah Code Ann. §
70A-2-601?
5.

Did the goods fail to conform to express or

implied warranties?
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6.

Did the lower court properly consider the usage

of trade as giving meaning to the agreement between the parties
as required by Utah Code Ann. §§ 7QA-l-205(3) and -208(2)?
7.

Did the lower court err in failing to construe

the contract as consistent with the usage of trade?
8.

Did Mark Grayson have actual, implied, or

apparent authority from Baum to act in accordance with the
usage of trade in receiving notice of rejection by Knight and
in giving further instructions regarding the disposition of the
goods?
9.

Did the lower court err in failing to hold that

Baum failed to mitigate his damages?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
This is an appeal from a Judgment against Knight on a

contract alleged to exist between Baum and Knight.
B.

Disposition of the Case Below.
The case was tried to the court on November 28, 1984.

The court issued a Memorandum Decision in Baum's favor (R.
189-92) on which Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were
entered (R. 196-99).
C.

Statement of Facts.
Plaintiff-appellee Michael Baum ("Baum") designed and

manufactured wearing apparel in New York City, New York, and
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did business as Baumwear by Michael Baum from 1980 to 1982.
(Tr. 11.)

Since 1974, defendant-appellant Dean Knight

("Knight") has done business as The Fashion Corner in Salt Lake
City, Utah, as a wholesaler of manufactured apparel goods.
(Tr. 55-56.)

This action was commenced by Baum against Knight

for an alleged breach by Knight of a contract by which Knight
ordered certain apparel goods from Baum.

After receiving the

goods, Knight inspected them and rejected them because they did
not conform to the representations made by the sales
representative, Mark Grayson.
Knight purchases apparel goods from numerous
manufacturers.

(Tr. 75.)

Over 95 percent of his purchases are

negotiated through sales or manufacturers representatives.

One

such sales representative who had represented manufacturers who
had sold goods to Knight was Mark Grayson.

(Tr. 58.)

Knight

testified that it is the usage of trade and standard practice
in the wholesale apparel goods industry for goods to be
returned by the buyer if, after receipt and inspection, the
goods are not merchantable or as represented.

In virtually all

such cases when a rejection has been made and the buyer desires
to return the goods, the buyer contacts the sales
representative who thereupon makes the arrangements with the
manufacturer for the goods to be returned.

In his entire

business experience as a wholesaler of apparel goods, Knight
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has returned goods 50 to 75 times per year, which have always
been accepted back by the manufacturer.

(Tr. 76-78.)

Knight was first contacted by Baum on or about October
26, 1982 through Mark Grayson, who was acting as sales
representative for Baum.

Baum and Grayson had met at Baum's

place of business in New York City.

Grayson agreed to call

Knight and to make an effort to sell Baum's goods to Knight.
(Tr. 19-21, 59-62, 83-84.)

Baum authorized Grayson to call

Knight and to solicit Knight to purchase the goods.
39-40.)

(Tr.

Baum agreed to pay Grayson a commission for his

services of $1.00 per garment sold.

(Tr. 37-39.) When Grayson

first contacted Knight about Baumwear, he made certain
representations about the style and quality of the clothing
that Baum manufactured.

For example, Grayson stated that the

goods had the look of fashion designer Norma Keimali and that
they were high fashioned fleece wear.

(Tr. 44, 82.) Knight

requested that Baum send samples of the clothing, but was told
by Grayson that there was not enough time since Baum was going
out of business.

(Tr. 62, 83-84.) Based upon Grayson's

representations concerning the clothing manufactured by Baum,
Knight ordered the goods.

(Tr. 62, 83-84.)

Baum made appropriate credit checks and called Knight
back to confirm the order.

Although Knight did not intend to

return the goods at the time he ordered them, it was part of
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the agreement between the parties that if the goods were not as
represented Knight would be entitled to reject them and return
them to Baum.

(Tr. 89-91.)

This was consistent with the

standard usage of trade under which goods purchased by
wholesalers sight unseen can return them if they are not as
represented or are unmerchantable.

(Tr. 78, 90.)

Prior to the time that Knight ordered the goods from
Baum through Grayson, Knight had dealt with Grayson on a number
of other occasions where Grayson represented other clothing
manufacturers.

Knight had rejected and returned goods on

several such occasions when, after receipt and inspection,
Knight determined that the goods were not as represented.

In

each such case Knight contacted Grayson who made the
arrangements with the manufacturer for the goods to be
returned.

Knight's practice of contacting Grayson regarding

the return of goods was consistent with the usage of trade.
(Tr. 80-81, 96-97, 113.)
Knight received the goods that he had ordered from
Baum during the first two weeks of November, 1982.

Immediately

upon receiving the goods, Knight and his brother, David,
inspected them and determined that the goods were not as had
been represented and were not sellable.

Specifically, the

style was not a Norma Kamali or Betsy Johnson, as had been
represented.

Mark Grayson had also described the goods as a
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"missy fleecy," which turned out not to be the case on
defendant's inspection of the goods. Knight further made an
aesthetic judgment regarding the merchantability of the goods,
based upon his experience in the industry in this particular
market area, and determined that the goods were not as
represented and would have to be returned.

(Tr. 64-65, 76,

71-72, 84-85, 106-07.)
Having made the determination to reject the goods,
Knight communicated with Mark Grayson within the day or two of
the receipt of the shipment.

Knight told Grayson the goods

were unacceptable and that he wanted to return them to Baum.
Grayson indicated that Baum was out of business and had moved
to up-state New York and requested that Knight cooperate in
attempting to find another buyer for the goods on Baum's
behalf.

At Grayson's request, Knight sent samples of the goods

to jobbers in Florida and California.

Grayson's intent was

apparently to attempt to sell the entire shipment of goods to
one of the jobbers.

(Tr. 66-68, 86, 97.) Had a sale been

made, the sale would have been for Baum's benefit.

(Tr. 97.)

The goods were rejected by both the jobbers in California and
in Florida.

(Tr. 66-68, 86, 97.) Upon receiving notification

of that fact, Knight had another conversation with Grayson in
which Knight requested the address to which the goods should be
sent.

Grayson subsequently obtained the address and informed
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Knight whereupon Knight returned the goods to the address
given, which was in Ithaca, New York.

(Tr. 98.)

Prior to returning the goods, Knight had a telephone
conversation with Baum on or about December 7, 1982, in which
he informed Baum of his rejection of the goods.
98.)

(Tr. 26-27,

Knight subsequently received a call from Baum's brother,

Andrew, in which Knight stated again his dissatisfaction with
the goods and his intent to return them.

(Tr. 98-99.)

Knight shipped the goods were shipped to Baum's
address in Ithaca, New York, by Consolidated Freightways.

Baum

testified that he was given notice of the shipment by
Consolidated Freightways, but that he refused to accept it.
(Tr. 28.)

The goods have since been liquidated by Consolidated

Freightways for storage and freight charges.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Knight's notice to Baum was timely when given to
Baum's agent, Mark Grayson, who was not only vested with actual
authority by Baum to act as his agent but, consistent with the
usage of trade, had apparent authority to receive Knight's
notice of rejection.

Knight justifiably rejected the goods

since they did not conform to the contract.
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ARGUMENT
I.
KNIGHT GAVE A VALID AND TIMELY
NOTICE OF REJECTION.
A.

Knight gave timely notice of rejection.
Following his inspection of the goods and

determination that they were not as had been represented, and
that they were unsellable, Knight immediately communicated with
Baum's sales representative, Mark Grayson, and informed him
that the goods were rejected and would be returned.

Grayson

requested Knight to send samples to two other jobbers in an
attempt to market the goods. Knight followed that request as
he was required to do under the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§ 70A-2-603(1), which requires a merchant buyer who has
rejected goods "to follow any reasonable instructions received
from the seller with respect to the goods." Had a sale
resulted, it would have been for Baum's account.

(Tr. 97.)

Knight's notification of Grayson of the rejection of
the nonconforming goods was timely under the provisions of the
Utah Uniform Commercial Code, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-602(a),
which states:
Rejection of goods must be within a reasonable
time after their delivery or tender. It is
ineffective unless the buyer seasonably notifies
the seller.
The UCC defines what is meant by the term "notifies," at Utah
Code Ann. § 70A-1-201(26), as follows:
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A person "notifies" or "gives" a notice or
notification to another by taking such steps as
may be reasonably required to inform the other in
ordinary course which or not such other actually
comes to know of it. A person "receives" a
notice or notification when
(a)

it comes to his attention;

(b)

it is duly delivered at the place of
business through which the contract was
made or at any other place held out by
him as the place for receipt of such
communications.

(Emphasis added.)
Section 70A-1-201(26) does not require that the seller
receive actual notice.

It is sufficient that the buyer take

"such steps as may be reasonably required to inform" the
seller.

As argued below, the uncontroverted evidence at trial

demonstrated that a wholesaler in the apparel industry who
desires to reject a shipment does so by notifying the sales
representative rather than the manufacturer.

The sales

representative thereafter makes arrangements with the
manufacturer regarding the return of the goods.

The lower

court erred in not construing the oral contract between the
parties as consistent with the usage of trade.

By informing

Grayson of the rejection of the goods, Knight did "notify" Baum
within the meaning of sections 70A-1-201(26) and 70A-2-602(l).
Grayson was BaunTs agent possessed of apparent, if not actual
authority, to receive notice of Knight's rejection.

-14-

B.

An agency relationship existed between Baum and Mark
Grayson.
The lower court found that "Grayson was not an

employee or agent of the plaintiff but, in fact, a freelancer
representative who, in this case, was more allied with the
defendant than the plaintiff . . . and that Grayson had no
authority to bind the plaintiff."

(R. 190-91.)

This finding,

however, is not supported by the evidence or the law.

The Utah

Supreme Court, in the case of Continental Bank & Trust Co. v.
Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 370, 1384 P.2d 796 (1963), defined agency,
following the Restatement (Second) of Agency, as follows:
Agency is the fiduciary relation which results
from the manifestation of consent by one person
to another that the other shall act on his behalf
and subject to his control, and consent by the
other so to act.
Id. at 800 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1
(1958)).

See Mountain States Moving & Storage Co. v. Suhr

Transport, Inc., 29 Utah 2d 295, 508 P.2d 812, 814 (1973)
(court identified the standard in the Continental Bank case as
the "traditional concept of agency").
Thus, where the principal intends that the agent shall
act for him and where the agent intends to accept the authority
and to act pursuant to the authority on behalf of the
principal, they have mutually consented to the creation of an
agency relationship.

See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Stevens, 16
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Utah 2d 424, 403 P.2d 31, 32 (1965).

Mutual consent may be

either express or implied.
The uncontroverted evidence in the present case
demonstrated that Baum and Grayson entered into an oral
agreement that Grayson act on Baum's behalf in locating a buyer
for Baum's goods and in negotiating the terms of the sale.
According to Baum's testimony, he agreed to pay Grayson a
commission of $1.00 per garment, in return for which Grayson
agreed to find a buyer and to arrange the sale of Baum?s
goods.

(Tr. 37-39.)

With the exception of details regarding

price, the negotiations regarding the sale were between Grayson
and Knight.

(Tr. 83.)

Baum admitted at the trial that he

authorized Grayson to call Knight from Baum's place of business
in New York City.

(Tr. 39-40.)

Grayson was thus an agent by

actual authority to represent Baum in the transaction and,
being so, was authorized to receive notice of Knight's
rejection of the goods.

That notice was seasonable since it

was given within a day of receipt of the goods.

The lower

court erred in holding that Knight's notice of rejection to
Grayson was ineffective.
The evidence also supports the implication of an
agency relationship between Baum and Grayson.

The existence of

implied consent may be proved by deductions or inferences from
the facts and circumstances of the particular situation,
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including the words and conduct, of the parties.

See Forsyth

v. Pendleton, 617 P.2d 358, 360-61 (Utah 1980) (Court upheld
finding of implied agency between party and her attorney based
on evidence that the attorney had been earlier involved in
executing the contract at issue and that the party had
forwarded to the attorney a letter pertaining to the default
under the contract to the attorney).
Mark Grayson's deposition was introduced in its
entirety as evidence at the trial.

(Exhibit 7-P.)

In his

deposition, Grayson testified that he was a sales
representative and that he had a "representative relationship11
with fifty or sixty manufacturers.

(Grayson Deposition, at

7-10.) Grayson testified that he was initially contacted by
Baum in response to one of Grayson's advertisements in a trade
publication.

(Grayson Deposition, at 19.) Grayson thereafter

met with Baum at his place of business, examined the goods, and
stated that he thought Knight might be interested in purchasing
them.

Grayson thereupon made a telephone call to Knight.

Baum

testified at the trial that he was present during the
conversation and was able to hear what Grayson said and that he
did not object to Grayson's actions.

(Tr. 40, 44.) Grayson

testified that Knight agreed to accept the merchandise and
order the goods while speaking with Grayson on the telephone
and before Baum ever spoke with Knight.
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(Grayson Deposition,

at 26-27.)

Knight similarly testified that he determined to

buy the goods based on his conversation with Grayson.
83-84.)

(Tr.

Grayson testified further that Baum agreed to

compensate him for his services by paying "eight percent or one
dollar per garment when he was paid by Fashion Corner."
(Grayson Deposition, at 36.)

The next question and answer in

the Grayson deposition indicate that Baum had in fact
authorized Grayson to perform the services on Baum's behalf in
soliciting Knight to purchase the goods and in preparing the
purchase order:
Q. Did Mr. Baum give you any authority to do
anything for him in connection with any deal
other than this particular sale to Fashion Corner?
A.

No.

(Grayson Deposition, at 36.)
Grayson's relationship to Baum as an agent was
clarified in the following testimony by Grayson:
Q. Let me make it more specific. Again,
this is in terms of the industry. Would you
characterize the relation as, you were acting as
a broker for Mr. Baum, or agent?
A. I was a sales rep, a sales
representative for Mr. Baum.
Q. In connection with being a sales
representative, generally, what sorts of powers
do you generally have?
A. Calling up potential customers who could
perhaps use some of the merchandise owned by the
company who wants me to sell for them, or who I
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approach to sell for them and they agree that I
perhaps can do some business for them.
Q. Do you or do you not have authority to
bind the manufacturer to a contract?
A.

I have no authority to do that.

Q. Everything must ultimately be approved
by the manufacturer?
A. They approve the credit and the prices
and the general order that goes out.
Q. And your role is basically to negotiate
with the prospective buyer?
A. I would say my role is generally to
describe the merchandise to the prospective buyer
and discuss prices, original prices, current
prices, where I think the merchandise fits into
the configuration of the merchandising concept of
the particular store or retail chain.
(Grayson Deposition, 66-67.)
The evidence was uncontroverted that Grayson was
Baum's sales representative and that, acting in that capacity
and in consideration of the commission that Baum agreed to pay
him, Grayson located a buyer, Dean Knight, and negotiated the
transaction with him.

Since he was thus authorized to deal

with Knight on behalf of Baum, this Court must hold that the
lower court's finding that Grayson was not Baum's agent was
erroneous and not supported by the evidence.
C.

Mark Grayson had apparent authority from Baum to
receive notice of rejection of the goods.
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Apparent authority is that which, though not actually
granted, the principal permits the agent to exercise or on
which third persons are entitled to rely based upon the acts of
the principal.
211 (1941).

Mailia v. Giles, 100 Utah 562, 114 P.2d 208,

See Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal.2d 412,

159 P.2d 958, 979 (1945) (The essential elements of apparent or
ostensible authority are representation by the principal,
justifiable reliance thereon by the third party, and change of
position or injury resulting from such reliance).

Apparent

authority must be determined from the facts and circumstances
of the transaction.

United States Bond and Finance Corp. v.

National Building and Loan Association, 80 Utah 62, 12 P.2d
758, 760 (1932).
The lower court ignored the issue whether Grayson had
apparent authority to receive notice of rejection of the
goods.

The evidence was clear that Grayson had apparent

authority from Baum to receive notice of the rejection of goods
based on Baum's manifestation to Knight that Grayson had
authority to act on Baum's behalf.

This manifestation was

given by Baum to Knight in the two telephone conversations
between them prior to the shipment of the goods in which Baum
confirmed or ratified the negotiations that Grayson had had
with Knight regarding the sale of the goods.

Baum made no

objection to the statements made by Grayson.

(Tr. 40-46.)
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Knight acted in good faith, had reason to believe, and did
actually believe that Grayson possessed authority from
plaintiff.

Relying on the appearance of authority in Grayson,

Knight continued to deal with Grayson regarding the rejection
and return of the goods.

The facts of the present case raise

an estoppel against Baum to deny that Grayson had authority
from him to deal with Knight regarding the rejection and return
of the goods.

This is particularly so in light of the evidence

that it was the standard practice in the industry for a buyer,
such as Knight, to notify the sales representative, rather than
the manufacturer, of the rejection of goods purchased.

Knight

did exactly what he had always done in rejecting goods in
hundreds of transactions.

He contacted the sales

representative.
D.

The lower court erred in not considering the usage of
trade under which wholesale buyers communicate with
the sales representative in giving notice of
rejection.
The lower court held that Knight's notice of rejection

to Grayson was not valid since Grayson was not Baum's agent.
In so ruling, the court refused to consider the relevant usage
of trade, which, according to the Utah Uniform Commercial Code,
should be considered in construing a sale's contract between
merchants.

The UCC, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-205 states:

(3) A course of dealing between parties and any usage
of trade in the vocation or trade in which they
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are engaged or which they should be aware give
particular meaning to and supplement or qualify
terms of an agreement.
(4)

The express terms of an agreement and an
applicable course of dealing or usage of trade
shall be construed wherever reasonable as
consistent with each other; but when such
construction is unreasonable express terms
control both the course of dealing and usage of
trade and course of dealing controls usage of
trade.

(Emphasis added).
An agent's apparent authority must thus also be seen
in light of the standard practices of the trade.

The

commentators in Restatement (Second) of Agency § 49, comment
c, state:
Inferences from agentys position.
Acts are interpreted in the light of
ordinary human experience. If a principal
puts an agent into, or knowingly permits him
to occupy, a position in which according to
the ordinary habits of persons in the
locality, trade or profession, it is usual
for such an agent to have a particular kind
of authority, any one dealing with him is
justified in inferring that he has such
authority in the absence of reason to know
otherwise. The content of such apparent
authority is a matter to be determined from
the facts.
"Usage of trade" is defined by the UCC as "any practice or
method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a
place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it
will be observed with respect to the transaction in question.
The existence and scope of such a usage are to be proved as
facts." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-205(2). See also Utah Code
Ann. § 70A-2-208(2) (express terms of an agreement, course of
performance, and usage of trade shall be construed whenever
reasonable as consistent with each other).
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(Emphasis added).
The present case falls precisely within the purview of
the foregoing comment from the Restatement.

Baum retained

Grayson as his representative, agreeing to pay him a
commission, and allowed him to deal with Knight in negotiating
a sale of the goods.

This was the customary function of a

sales representative in the wholesale apparel goods industry.
(Tr. 58.)

The evidence was uncontroverted that it is also the

function of a sale representative in the industry to receive
notice of a rejection of goods by a buyer and to make
arrangements with the manufacturer for their return.
76-77.)

(Tr.

That being the case, Knight was entitled to infer that

Grayson had authority to accept notice of rejection in the
absence of any reason to know otherwise.
In the case of Vickers v. North American Land
Developments, Inc., 94 N.M. 65, 607 P.2d 603 (1980), the court
considered a suit by a purchaser seeking specific performance
of a land sales contract which they claimed they had entered
into with the agent of the seller.

The seller denied that the

alleged agent had any authority to enter into the contract.
The court held that, while the agent lacked actual authority to
buy the seller, he did have apparent authority, having been
placed in a position by the principal "which would lead a
reasonably prudent person to believe that the agent did indeed
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possess that apparent authority."

Id. at 605.

The court

relied on Restatement (First) of Agency § 49, comment b, which
was substantially identical to comment c of the Second
Restatement quoted above, and held that the agent was
possessed of apparent authority which the principal was
estopped to deny.

Id. at 605.

The Restatement (Second) of Agency § 34 suggests
circumstances to be considered in interpreting an
authorization, including "the general usages of business, the
usages of trades or employments of the kind to which the
authorization relates, and the business methods of the
principal."

Id. § 34(b) (emphasis added).

Section 36 of the

Second Restatement provides further that, unless otherwise
agreed, "an agent is authorized to comply with the relevant
usages of business if the principal has notice that usages of
such nature may exist."

Notice to Baum of the relevant usage

of trade may be inferred, according to comment c:
A person carrying on business has reason to know,
and hence has notice of, the usages of the place
in which he does business with respect to the
type of business he conducts. If both principal
and agent are in the same locality and are
engaged in the same kind of business, it is
inferred that the authorization is to act in
accordance with such usages.
Mark Grayson's dealings with Baum and with Knight must
not be viewed in a vacuum.

Knight had previously rejected and
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returned the goods in hundreds of purchase transactions, (Tr.
76), including many in which Grayson had acted as the sales
representative of the manufacturers.

(Tr. 97.)

In nearly

every such instance, Knight communicated with the sales
representative when giving notice of the rejection rather than
the manufacturer.

(Tr. 76-77.) Knight's practice was

consistent with the standard practice in the industry.
76.)

(Tr.

Consistent with that usage of trade, Knight testified,

Grayson was to take care of all of the arrangements to have the
goods returned, as he had in the past on every one of the
thirty or so occasions when he had represented manufacturers
who had sold to Knight.

(Tr. 80-81.)

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-205(3), the usage
of trade gives "particular meaning to and supplements or
qualifies" the terms of the agreement between Baum and Knight.
By authorizing Mark Grayson, as a sales representative, to
contact Knight and to negotiate the sale, Baum thereby put
Grayson in a position of apparent authority upon which Knight
justifiably relied in giving notice of the rejection.

Knight

acted as he had in the vast majority of situations where he had
determined to return goods --he gave notice to the sales
representative.

That notice was effective and seasonable under

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-602(l) and the lower court erred in not
so finding.
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Moreoever, the usage of trade must be construed as
consistent with the oral agreement between the parties if at
all possible, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A-l-205(4) and
70A-2-208(2).

Because the usage of trade recognizes that sales

representatives have authority to receive notice of rejection,
(Tr. 76), construction of the oral agreement in this case
consistent with that usage must result in a finding of
apparent, if not actual, authority by Baum to Grayson to
continue to act on his behalf insofar as necessary to receive
the notice of rejection from Knight.
E.

Grayson was not Knight's agent.
The lower court, while it did not specifically find

that Grayson was Knight's agent, found that Grayson was "more
closely allied with the defendant."

(R. 198.)

Although the

effect of this finding is not apparent in the record, it is
contrary to the uncontroverted evidence.

As shown in subpart B

above, Grayson's relationship was with Baum.

Grayson was to

receive his compensation from Baum and it was on Baum's behalf
that Grayson contacted Knight and arranged the sale of the
goods.

Grayson represented many manufacturers in selling goods

to numerous buyers including Knight.

Grayson's conduct in

contacting Knight and negotiating the sale of goods to him from
Baum's place of business does not meet the elements necessary
to establish an agency relationship.
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Grayson himself testified

he was Baum's representative.

(Grayson Deposition, at 66-67.)

Although Grayson signed Baum's purchase order, as buyer, there
was no evidence that he was authorized by Knight to sign.

The

lower court's finding that the purchase order was "signed by
Mark Grayson for the defendant," (R-197) was unsupported by any
evidence.

Knight testified that he had never authorized

Grayson to sign any purchase order.

(Tr. 81, 91.)

There was

certainly no mutual consent between Knight and Grayson that
Grayson act as Knight's agent, nor did Knight exercise any
degree of control over Grayson's activities.

To the contrary,

Knight testified that he followed Grayson's directions
concerning the disposal of the goods after the rejection.

(Tr.

97.) Again, this was consistent with the standard practice in
the industry, and the lower court committed error in not so
construing the contract between the parties.
F.

In the alternative, Knight's notice to Baum
personally was sufficient.
Even if Knight's notice of rejection to Mark Grayson

was inadequate, Knight argues in the alternative that the
requirements of Section 70A-2-602(l) were satisfied when Knight
spoke with Baum on the telephone on or about December 7, 1982.
It is undisputed that Knight personally told Baum at that time
that he was rejecting the goods.

Shortly after, Knight also

told Baum's brother, an attorney, the same thing.
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(Tr.

101-02.)

Those communications were sufficient to satisfy the

notice requirements of section 70A-2-602(l), which requires
only that the notice be "seasonable."

Section 70A-1-204 states:

(2)

What is a reasonable time for taking any
action depends on the nature, purpose and
circumstances of such action.

(3)

An action is taken "seasonably" when it is
taken at or within the time agreed or if no
time is agreed at or within a reasonable
time.

Thus, Knight notified Baum "seasonably" because the
notice was given within a reasonable time.

Again, the oral

agreement between the parties must be construed as consistent
with the usage of trade, under Sections 70A-1-205(3), (4) and
70A-2-208(2).

Knight acted consistent with the usage of trade

in giving notice to Baum personally in their telephone
conversation of December 7, 1982, particularly in light of his
efforts to contact Baum through Grayson.

The UCC does not

require that a buyer return rejected goods within a reasonable
time, only that he notify the seller within a reasonable
time.

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-602(l).

According to the

uncontroverted evidence, whenever Knight returned goods he
purchased from Grayson, it sometimes would be more than a month
before the goods would be shipped back.

(Tr. 81.)

If the

notice requirement was not satisfied by Knight's communication
with Mark Grayson it was certainly satisfied when he spoke with
Baum personally on or about December 7, 1982.
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II.
KNIGHT'S REJECTION OF THE GOODS WAS VALID AND
JUSTIFIED UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE.
As demonstrated at trial, Knight was justified in
rejecting the apparel goods that he had ordered from Baum.

A

buyer's right to reject goods is governed by Utah Code Ann.
§ 70A-2-601 (1981), which provides:
Buyer's rights on improper delivery.
Subject to the provisions of this chapter on
breach in installment contracts (section
70A-2-612) and unless otherwise agreed under the
sections on contractual limitations of remedy
(sections 70A-2-718 and 701A-2-719), if the goods
or the tender of delivery fail in any respect to
conform to the contract, the buyer may
(a) reject the whole; or
(b) accept the whole; or
(c) accept any commercial unit or units and
reject the rest.
(Emphasis added.)
By allowing a rejection of the whole shipment if the
tender of delivery fails "in any respect to conform to the
contract," Section 70A-2-601 codifies the "perfect tender rule"
applied by the courts prior to the adoption of the UCC.

See

Moulton Cavity & Mold, Inc. v. Lyn-flex Industries, Inc., 396
A.2d 1024, 1027 (Me. 1979) (UCC § 2-601 represents a
continuation of the perfect tender rule).

As the court in

Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc. v. Conley, 372 So. 2d 965
(Fla. App. 1979), stated:
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The statutory scheme leaves no doubt that,
when non-conforming tender is delivered, it is
the buyer's choice whether to reject the goods
and cause a recission [sic] of the contract,
suing for their purchase price, or whether to
accept the goods and receive . . . damages for
breach of warranty . . . .
Id. at 969.
Defendant Dean Knight and his brother, David Knight,
each testified that the goods ordered from Baum did not conform
to the agreement; were not as represented; and were generally
not merchantable in their market area.
After inspecting Baum's apparel goods, Mark Grayson
called Knight on the telephone and described the goods to him.
In his description, Grayson identified the goods with the
styles of fashion designer Norma Kamali.

Knight testified as

follows regarding Gray's representations concerning the goods:
Q.
Now, you have already testified today
about your first conversation with Mark Grayson,
but I would like to ask you if you can to tell me
everything that you remember Mark Grayson saying
to you about these particular goods that were
being sold by Baumwear.
A.
Well, as I remember, he called me from
Baumwear and said they were a Norma Kamali look,
that they were quite high fashioned fleece
goods. There was a good breakdown, that the
sizes were good and there weren't many of them.
He did say it was quite a bit off the normal
wholesale price. I don't know if 70 percent was
ever mentioned, and I don't know if it is 70
percent off. He did mention there was quite a
discount.
0.
I think v ou used the term "fleece."
Can you tell me what that means?
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A.
"Fleece wear" is basically a material
and at that particular point in time, Norma
Kamali was dealing quite a bit in these goods
with ruffles, and so forth and so on, and that is
what we pictured and envisioned the goods to be.
Q.

Did you use the term "breakdown" also?

A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

What does that mean?

A.
I thought the breakdown was going to be
a certain number of tops, with a certain number
of bottoms, and that was going to be, if not
perfect, good.
Q.
Do you remember whether he said it was
perfect or good?
A.
I don't.
breakdown.

I think he said it was a good

(Tr. 81-82.)
Knight's testimony was uncontroverted.

Baum admitted

that Grayson described the goods as being like the style of
Norma Kamali.

(Tr. 44.)

Knight testified that it is the standard practice in
the wholesale apparel industry for wholesalers who purchase
goods sight unseen to be able to return the goods if they are
unsatisfactory.

(Tr. 90.)

In his first conversation with

Grayson, Knight stated he would keep the goods if they were as
represented.

(Tr. 89.)

Knight testified that the practice in

the industry is to protect the buyer because, as he stated,
"[m]ost of the salesmen always have floating terms, and my
perception is not always what their perception is.

-31-

And so,

consequently, when the goods arrive they are totally different
than what we had thought they would be.
express that fact and return them."

And so we call up and

(Tr. 78-79.)

David

Knight, defendant's partner, testified that it is normal to
return goods that are aesthetically unsatisfactory.

(Tr. 113.)

The lower court found that "the goods were not
defective but that defendant simply did not like the aesthetics
of the goods when they arrived."

(R. 198.)

This finding,

while consistent with the evidence, underplays the importance
of aesthetics in the apparel market.
is aesthetically pleasing.

Consumers only buy what

Hence the importance to a

wholesaler such as Knight to be able to purchase goods that are
attractive from an aesthetic point of view.

Knight purchased

Baum's goods sight unseen based on Grayson's representations.
Knight inspected the goods after receiving them and found them
not to be as represented.

The goods did not look like Norma

Kamalifs style, and could not have been marketed in the area in
which Knight sells apparel goods.
106-107.)

(Tr. 64-65, 71-72, 85,

Knight would have sold the goods ordered from Baum

to small stores mainly in the Rocky Mountain States.
74-75.)

(Tr.

David Knight testified that because of the lack of

aesthetic value of the goods
they
were
that
over

would be very difficult to market, if they
marketable at all, particularly in the area
we sell . . . I think that when you purchase
the years, and I have been a buyer for a
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number of years, I just think some things are
instinctive and I felt that they were ugly, when
I say 'poor esthetic [sic] value.' I thought,
personally, we would have a very, very difficult
time in marketing. I thought they were very
forward fashions. They would be very difficult
to market in our area, if at all possible.
(Tr. 106-07.)
Baum's representations concerning the goods, made
through his sales representative, Mark Grayson, constituted
express warranties about the goods within the meaning of Utah
Code Ann. § 70A-2-313(1).

The goods were further subject to

implied warranties of merchantability, under Section 70A-2-314,
which states:
(1)

Unless excluded or modified (section
70A-2-316), a warranty that the goods shall
be merchantable is implied in a contract for
their sale if the seller is a merchant with
respect to goods of that kind.

(2)

Goods to be merchantable must be at least
such as
(a)

(3)

pass without objection in the trade
under the contract description;

Unless excluded or modified (section
70A-2-316) other implied warranties may
arise from course of dealing or usage of
trade.

The evidence was virtually undisputed that the goods
did not conform to the representations and generally were not
saleable.

Baum thus breached the express and implied

-33-

warranties as to the quality of the goods, and defendant was
entitled to reject.
III.
BAUM FAILED TO MITIGATE HIS DAMAGES
Following presentation of Baum's case, Knight moved
the Court to dismiss the action for failure of Baum to prove
any specific damages.
denied.

(Tr. 94-95) which the Court erroneously

The remedies available to a seller were "the buyer

wrongfully rejects" are generally itemized in Utah Code Ann. §
70A-2-703.

If the court determines that Knight wrongfully

rejected in this case, then Baum must look to the remedies
enumerated in that section.

Although Baum did not specifically

elect which remedy he intended to pursue, his argument at the
trial suggested his reliance on Section 70A-2-706 (damages for
nonacceptance) or Section 70A-2-709 (action for the price).

The other remedies listed in section 70A-2-703 are
inapplicable under the facts of this case. They provide that a
seller may:
(a) withhold delivery of such goods;
(b)

stop delivery by any bailee as hereafter provided
(section 70A-2-705);

(c) proceed under the next section respecting goods
still unidentified to the contract;
.

. . .

(f) cancel.
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Under either section Baum had a duty to mitigate his damages by
selling the goods or by subtracting the market value of the
goods from the contract price.

Baum did not meet this duty.

Rather, he testified that when the goods were returned to him
he refused to accept delivery from the carrier.

(Tr. 28.) The

goods were subsequently sold by the carrier to cover its
costs.

Baum failed to introduce evidence of the market value

of the goods, and the lower court erred in not holding that
Baum failed to meet his burden of proving damages.

The seller

has the burden of proving his damages by a preponderance of the
evidence.

4 R. Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code § 2-708:15

(3d ed. 1983).
A.

Damages for nonacceptance or repudiation.
Section 70A-2-708 provides for seller's damages for

nonacceptance or repudiation, as follows:
(1)

Subject to subsection (2) and to the
provisions of this chapter with respect to
proof of market price (section 70A-2-723),
the measure of damages for nonacceptance or
repudiation by the buyer is the difference
between the market price at the time and
place for tender and the unpaid contract
price together with any incidental damages
provided in this chapter (section
70A-2-710), but less expenses saved in
consequence of the buyer's breach.
(2) If the measure of damages provided in
subsection (1) is inadequate to put the
seller in as good a position as performance
would have done then the measure of damages
is the profit (including reasonable
overhead) which the seller would have made
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from full performance by the buyer, together
with any incidental damages provided in this
chapter (section 70A-2-710), due allowance
for costs reasonably incurred and due credit
for payments or proceeds of resale.
(Emphas is added.)
Baum is precluded from recovering damages under this
section because he failed to put on evidence of the market
price of the goods in November of 1982.

There is no evidence

in the record that the formula in subparagraph (1) would not
put plaintiff in as good a position as performance.

"When lost

profits are awarded, it is necessary that the record show why
the contract price-market price formula was not appropriate."
4 R. Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code § 2-708:21.
The "lost profits" provisions of subparagraph (2) of
section 70A-2-708 are inapplicable in the present case.

That

section was intended to compensate a seller such as a dealer or
volume seller who, even though he has been able to resell the
goods, has suffered a loss of profit because the person to whom
he resold the goods would have bought the item in any event.
Thus, the seller obtained only one sale when he could have had
two.

See 4 R. Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code § 2-708:21;

J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code 226 (1972).
Because Baum has failed to prove the elements of
damages, including market value of the goods, he cannot recover
under section 70A-2-708.

That section contemplates a
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mitigation of damages by the seller--which Baum failed to do
when he allowed the goods to be liquidated by the carrier
rather than to accept delivery and resell them.
B.

Action for the price.
Section 70A-2-709 provides by the seller of the price,

as follows:
(1) When the buyer fails to pay the price as it
becomes due the seller may recover, together
with any incidental damages under the next
section, the price
(a) of goods accepted or of conforming
goods lost or damaged within a
commercially reasonable time after risk
of their loss has passed to the buyer;
and
(b)

of goods identified to the contract if
the seller is unable after reasonable
effort to resell them at a reasonable
price or the circumstances reasonably
indicate that such effort will be
unavailing.

(2) Where the seller sues for the price he must
hold for the buyer any goods which have been
identified to the contract and are still in
his control except that if resale becomes
possible he may resell them at amy time
prior to the collection of the judgment.
The net proceeds of any such resale must be
credited to the buyer and payment of the
judgment entitles him to any goods not
resold.
(3) After the buyer has wrongfully rejected or
revoked acceptance of the goods or has
failed to make a payment due or has
repudiated (section 70A-2-610), a seller who
is held not entitled to the price under this
section shall nevertheless be awarded
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damages for nonacceptance under the
preceding section,
(Emphas is added.)
This section appears to be inappropriate in the
present case in governing the measure of damages.

It allows a

seller to recover the price of the goods if the goods were
accepted, lost, or damaged, or if the seller has not been able
to resell at a "reasonable price or the circumstances
reasonably indicate that such effort will be unavailing."

In

the present case the evidence showed that defendant did not
3
"accept" the goods.
He rejected them and returned them to
Baum, who allowed them to be liquidated.

Therefore, Baum's

claims for the price must fail, not having satisfied the
requirements of Section 70A-2-709.
CONCLUSION
Knight urges this Court to hold in his favor and to
reverse the judgment of the lower court on the basis that he
justifiably rejected the goods shipped by Baum and gave
effective notice thereof to Baum by communicating both with
Mark Grayson and with Baum himself within a reasonable time
after receipt of the goods.

Knight's rejection and motive was

"Acceptance" is a term of art under the UCC, and is
defined in section 70A-2-606, and includes situations where the
buyer "fails to make an effective rejection." Defendant did
not "accept" the goods, having made an effective rejection.
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consistent with the usage of trade.

Even if the Court upholds

the finding that Knight's rejection was wrongful, the lower
court must be reversed because Baum failed to put on evidence
as to damages.

Baum refused to receive the goods back and so

failed to mitigate his damages by allowing them to be
liquidated.
ADDENDUM
The following statutes from the Utah Uniform
Commercial Code are relevant to the issues in this appeal:
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-201(26):
(26) A person "notifies" or "gives" a
notice or notification to another by taking such
steps as may be reasonably required to inform the
other in ordinary course whether or not such
other actually comes to know of it. A person
"receives" a notice or notification when
(a)

it comes to his attention; or

(b) it is duly delivered at the place of
business through which the contract was made or
at any other place held out by him as the place
for receipt of such communications.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-l-204(2), (3):
(2) What is a reasonable time for taking
any action depends on the nature, purpose and
circumstance of such action.
(3) An action is taken "seasonably" when it
is taken at or within the time agreed or if no
time is agreed at or within a reasonable time.
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Utah Code Ann. § 70A-l-205(3):
(3) A course of dealing between parties and any
usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which they
are engaged or of which they are or should be aware
give particular meaning to and supplement or qualify
terms of an agreement.
(4) The express terms of an agreement and an
applicable course of dealing or usage of trade shall
be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with
each other; but when such construction is unreasonable
express terms control both course of dealing and usage
of trade and course of dealing controls usage of trade.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-208(2):
(2) The express terms of the agreement and any
such course of performance, as well as any course of
dealing and usage of trade, shall be construed
whenever reasonable as consistent with each other; but
when such construction is unreasonable, express terms
shall control course of performance and course of
performance shall control both course of dealing and
usage of trade (section 70A-1-205).
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-313(l):
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created
as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by
the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and
becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an
express warranty that the goods shall conform to the
affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made
part of the basis of the bargain creates an express
warranty that the goods shall conform to the
description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of
the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty
that the whole of the goods shall conform to the
sample or model.
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Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-314:
(1) Unless excluded or modified (section
70A-2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be
merchantable is implied in a contract for their
sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to
goods of that kind. Under this section the
servicing for value of food or drink to be
consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a
sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at
least such as
(a) pass without objection in the
trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are
of fair average quality within the description;
and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes
for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations
permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality
and quantity within each unit and among all units
involved; and
(e) are adequately contained,
packaged, and labeled as the agreement may
require; and
(f) conform to the promises or
affirmations of fact made on the container or
label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (section
70A-2-316) other implied warranties may arise
from course of dealing or usage of trade.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-601:
Subject to the provisions of this chapter on
breach in installment contracts (section
70A-2-612) and unless otherwise agreed under the
sections on contractual limitations of remedy
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(sections 70A-2-718 and 70A-2-719), if the goods
or the tender of delivery fail in any respect to
conform to the contract, the buyer may
(a)

reject the whole; or

(b)

accept the whole; or

(c) accept any commercial unit or units and
reject the rest.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-602:
(1) Rejection of goods must be within a
reasonable time after their delivery or tender.
It is ineffective unless the buyer seasonably
notifies the seller.
(2) Subject to the provisions of the two
following sections on rejected goods (sections
70A-2-603 and 70A-2-604).
(a) after rejection any exercise of
ownership by the buyer, with respect to any
commercial unit is wrongful as against the
seller; and
(b) if the buyer has before rejection
taken physical possession of goods in which he
does not have a security interest under the
provisions of this chapter (subsection (3) of
section 70A-2-711), he is under a duty after
rejection to hold them with reasonable care at
the seller's disposition for a time sufficient to
permit the seller to remove them but
(c) the buyer has no further
obligations with regard to goods rightfully
rejected.
(3) The seller's rights with respect to
goods wrongfully rejected are governed by the
provisions of this chapter on seller's remedies
in general (section 70A-2-703).
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Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-603:
(1) Subject to any security interest in the
buyer (subsection (3) of section 70A-2-711), when
the seller has no agent or place of business at
the market of rejection a merchant buyer is under
a duty after rejection of goods in his possession
or control to follow any reasonable instructions
received from the seller with respect to the
goods and in the absence of such instructions to
make reasonable effort to sell them for the
seller's account if they are perishable or
threaten to decline in value speedily.
Instructions are not reasonable if on demand
indemnity for expenses is not forthcoming.
(2) When the buyer sells goods under
subsection (1), he is entitled to reimbursement
from the seller or out of the proceeds for
reasonable expenses of caring for and selling
them, and if the expenses include no selling
commission then to such commission as is usual in
the trade or if there is none to a reasonable sum
not exceeding ten percent on the gross proceeds.
(3) In complying with this section the
buyer is held only to good faith and good faith
conduct hereunder is neither acceptance nor
conversion nor the basis of action for damages.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-703:
Where the buyer wrongfully rejects or
revokes acceptance of goods or fails to make a
payment due on or before delivery or repudiates
with respect to a part or the whole, then with
respect to any goods directly affected and, if
the breach is of the whole contract (section
70A-2-612), then also with respect to the whole
undelivered balance, the aggrieved seller may
(a) withhold delivery of such goods;
(b) stop delivery by any bailee as
hereafter provided (section 70A-2-705);
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(c) proceed under the next section
respecting goods still unidentified to the
contract;
(d) resell and recover damages as hereafter
provided (section 70A-2-706);
(e) recover damages for nonacceptance
(section 70A-2-708) or in a proper case the price
(section 70A-2-709);
(f) cancel.
Utah Code Ann § 70A-2-706:
(1) Under the conditions stated in section
70A-2-703 on seller's remedies, the seller may
resell the goods concerned or the undelivered
balance thereof. Where the resale is made in
good faith and in a commercially reasonable
manner the seller may recover the difference
between the resale price and the contract price
together with any incidental damages allowed
under the provisions of this chapter (section
70A-2-710), but less expenses saved in
consequence of the buyer's breach.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in
subsection (3) or unless otherwise agreed resale
may be at public or private sale including sale
by way of one or more contracts to sell or of
identification to an existing contract of the
seller. Sale may be as a unit or in parcels and
at any time and place and on any terms but every
aspect of the sale including the method, manner,
time, place and terms must be commercially
reasonable. The resale must be reasonably
identified as referring to the broken contract,
but it is not necessary that the goods be in
existence or that any or all of them have been
identified to the contract before the breach.
(3) Where the resale is at private sale the
seller must give the buyer reasonable
notification of his intention to resell.
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(4)

Where the resale is at public sale

(a) only identified goods can be sold
except where there is a recognized market for a
public sale of futures in goods of the kind; and
(b) it must be made at a usual place
or market for public sale if one is reasonably
available and except in the case of goods which
are perishable or threaten to decline in value
speedily the seller must give the buyer
reasonable notice of the time and place of the
resale; and
(c) if the goods are not to be within
the view of those attending the sale the
notification of sale must state the place where
the goods are located and provide for their
reasonable inspection by prospective bidders; and
(d)

the seller may buy.

(5) A purchaser who buys
resale takes the goods free of
original buyer even though the
comply with one or more of the
this section.

in good faith at a
any rights of the
seller fails to
requirements of

(6) The seller is not accountable to the
buyer for any profit made on any resale. A
person in the position of a seller (section
70A-2-707) or a buyer who has rightfully rejected
or justifiably revoked acceptance must account
for any excess over the amount of his security
interest, as hereinafter defined (subsection (3)
of section 70A-2-711).
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-708:
(1) Subject to subsection (2) and to the
provisions of this chapter with respect to proof
of market price (section 70A-2-723), the measure
of damages for nonacceptance or repudiation by
the buyer is the difference between the market
price at the time and place for tender and the
unpaid contract price together with any
incidental damages provided in this chapter
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(section 70A-2-710), but less expenses saved in
consequence of the buyer's breach.
(2) If the measure of damages provided in
subsection (1) is inadequate to put the seller in
as good a position as performance would have done
then the measure of damages is the profit
(including reasonable overhead) which the seller
would have made from full performance by the
buyer, together with any incidental damages
provided in this chapter (section 70A-2-710), due
allowance for costs reasonably incurred and due
credit for payments or proceeds of resale.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-709:
(1) When the buyer fails to pay the price
as it becomes due the seller may recover,
together with any incidental damages under the
next section, the price
(a) of goods accepted or of conforming
goods lost or damaged within a commercially
reasonable time after risk of their loss has
passed to the buyer; and
(b) of goods identified to the
contract if the seller is unable after reasonable
effort to resell them at a reasonable price or
the circumstances reasonably indicate that such
effort will be unavailing.
(2) Where the seller sues for the price he
must hold for the buyer any goods which have been
identified to the contract and are still in his
control except that if resale becomes possible he
may resell them at any time prior to the
collection of the judgment. The net proceeds of
any such resale must be credited to the buyer and
payment of the judgment entitles him to any goods
not resold.
(3) After the buyer has wrongfully rejected
revoked acceptance of the goods or has failed to
make a payment due or has repudiated (section
70A-2-610), a seller who is held not entitled to
the price under this section shall nevertheless
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be awarded damages for nonacceptance under the
preceding section.
Knight has further appended hereto copies of the
following documents:
1.

Memorandum Decision.

(R. 189-92.)

2.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

(R.

196-99.)
DATED THIS 3>0

day of July, 1985.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
J. Keith Adams
R. Stephen Marshall

f^^^^^"1^^^^^

By

Attorneys for Appellant Dean Knight
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3400
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed four true
and correct copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief, postage
prepaid, this

day of July, 1985, to:
John C. Greene, Esq.
Cotro-Manes, Warr, Green & Shand
311 South State Street, Suite 280
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

fl'^yl^SlAyK^^Jj

6470M
073185
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DEC 18 1984
H r,<x

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MICHAEL BAUM, dba
BAUMWEAR BY MICHAEL BAUM,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIVIL NO. C-83-401

Plaintiff,
vs.
DEAN KNIGHT, dba THE
FASHION CORNER,
Defendant.

Trial in the above matter was held on November

30, 1984.

The Court having heard testimony, received evidence and exhibits,
took the matter under advisement, and now renders its decision.
The Court

finds as follows:

to sell to the defendant at "going
the goods in question;

That the plaintiff offered
out of business" discount

that defendant knew that the plaintiff

was going out of business, and that the plaintiff was required
to vacate his premises immediately, and that the plaintiff was
moving out of New York City; that the defendant waived the receiving
of a "sample" because of his knowledge of plaintiff's urgency
in disposing of the goods; that defendant
and authorized

shipment

accepted

the offer

of the goods; that the purchase order

was signed by Grayson for the defendant, and that the purchase
order

specifically

required

goods to be returned;

that

"written

authorization"

the plaintiff

told

for any

the defendant

PAGE TWO

BAUM V. KNIGHT

MEMORANDUM DECISION

at the time of sale that such sale was final, and that he could
not take back
thereto
unload

the goods, and that

indicated
the goods

he had faith
if he did

the defendant

in response

in Grayson, and could

always

not like them; that the defendant

attempted on his own to sell the goods on his own invoice subsequent
to his receipt of the same

in Salt Lake City; that after the

defendant's failure to sell the goods on his own

invoice, he

then attempted to return the same, but was refused; that defendant
sent the goods anyway, without written authorization;
defendant

never attempted

to contact the plaintiff

that the
in regards

to return of the goods until it was too late for these seasonal
goods to be moved;
the plaintiff moving

that defendant

knew from the beginning of

from New York City back

to his home in

Ithaca, New York, but made no attempt to locate the plaintiff
in a timely manner; that the defendant testified
have contacted the plaintiff
the defendant admits

that he would

if he had known his address; that

that some manufacturers

require

written

authorization before goods are returned; that the goods in question
were not defective, but defendant simply did not like the aesthetics
when receiving the same in Salt Lake City; that the goods were
described to the defendant by Grayson and by the plaintiff prior
to and at the time of the sale; that defendant knew the goods
were seasonable, but made no timely effort to contact the plaintiff;
that Grayson was not an employee or agent of the plaintiff but,

ioo

BAUM V. KNIGHT

PAGE THREE

in fact, a freelancer
more allied

MEMORANDUM DECISION

representative who, in this case, was

with the defendant

than the plaintiff; that this

was not an "approval sale"; and that Grayson had no authority
to bind the plaintiff.
Based

upon the above findings, it is the conclusion

this Court that plaintiff is entitled to Judgment
of $13,392.50, plus the legal
28, 1982 until paid.

rate of interest

of

in the amount
from October

Each party will bear his own

attorney's

fees.
Plaintiff's attorney will prepare

the Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law, an^ Judgment.
Dated this

//;

day of December, 1984.

"LEONARD H. RU5S&N
L/blSTRICT COURT JUDGE

ATTEST
H. DIXON HINDLFY
Clerk

Deptfty Ciark
Ci

BAUM V. KNIGHT

MEMORANDUM DECISION

PAGE FOUR

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify

that I mailed

a true and correct

copy

of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the
following this

\£

day of December, 1984:

John C. Green
Attorney for Plaintiff
311 South State, Suite 280
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2377
J. Keith Adams
R. Stephen Marshall
Attorneys for Defendant
P. 0. Box 3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3400
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FILED IN CLERKS OFF!'
Cn'.tLakoCi-ntv Utd

JAN 10 1965

JOHN C. GREEN, No. 1242
Attorney for Plaintiff
311 South State, Suite 280
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2377
Telephone: (801) 531-1300
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MICHAEL BAUM, d.b.a.
BAUMWEAR BY MICHAEL BAUM,

:

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,

Civil No. C83-401

vs.
:
DEAN KNIGHT, d.b.a. THE
FASHION CORNER,

:

Defendant.
The

above-entitled

Judge Leonard H. Russon

:
matter

having

come

on

regularly

for trial on the 30th day of November, 1984, before The
Honorable
Court.

Leonard

H. Russon, Judge of the above-entitled

The plaintiff Michael Baurn was represented by his

counsel of record, John C. Green, the defendant Dean Knight
was represented

by his counsel, R. Steven Marshall.

the witnesses having been

And

sworn and having testified and

the Court having heard the argument of counsel and having
taken

the matter

under advisement

and

having

issued

its

Memorandum Decision and being fully advised in the premises,
the Court now makes these its

is$

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That

County,

State

the
of

defendant
Utah,

and

is

a

resident

operates

a

of

Salt

business

Lake

known

as

The Fashion Corner located at 6825 South 400 West, Midvale,
Utah.
2.
the

That on or about the

plaintiff

delivered

to

28th day of October, 1982,

the

defendant

goods

on

open

account for the sum of $13,392.50.
3.

That the plaintiff

had

offered

to sell defendant

at "going out of business" discount the goods in question.
That the plaintiff was going out of business, that he was
being required to vacate his premises immediately and that
he was moving from New York City, New York.
4.

That

defendant

waived

the

right

to

receive

a

"sample" of the goods because he knew of plaintiff's urgency
in disposing of the goods.
5.

That the defendant accepted the offer and authorized

shipment of the goods.
6.
by

That

Mark

order

a

Grayson

purchase
for

specifically

the

order

was

defendant

required

prepared

and

"written

that

and
the

signed
purchase

authorization

for

any goods to be returned."
7.

That plaintiff

told defendant at the time of the

sale that such sale was final and that he "plaintiff" could
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not take back the goods and that the defendant in response
indicated he had faith in Grayson and could always unload
the goods if he did not like them.
8.

That

the defendant

attempted

to sell the goods

on his own invoice after receipt of said goods.
9.

That after defendant's failure to sell the goods

on his own invoice

he attempted

to return the same but

was refused in a telephone conversation with the plaintiff
but sent the goods anyway without any written authorization.
10.

The

defendant

in regards to the return

of the

goods until it was to late for the seasonal goods to be
moved and further made no attempt to locate the plaintiff
in a timely manner even though he knew he was moving to
Ithacar New York.
11.

Defendant indicated that some manufacturers require

written authorization before goods are returned but testified
that the goods were not defective but that defendant simply
did not like the aesthetics of the goods when they arrived
even though the goods were described to the defendant by
Mark Grayson and by plaintiff.
12.

The defendant knew the goods were seasonable but

made no timely effort to contact plaintiff.
13.

Grayson was not an employee or agent of the plain-

tiff but was more closely allied with the defendant.
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14.

The

defendant

knew

that

the

sale

was

not

an

"approva1 sale."
FROM

THE

FOREGOING

THE

COURT NOW MAKES

THESE, ITS

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Plaintiff

is entitled

$13,392.50 plus the

legal

to Judgment
rate of

in the amount of

interest

from

October

28, 1982, until paid, together with his costs
. of _^T^r/L^

DATED this

ATTEST
H. DIXON HiNDLEY
Clerk
**

OepuScierk

,
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BY THE COURT:

/ , '

%

JUDGE LEONAREMr: RUSSON

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a copy of the
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to Mr.
R. Stephen Marshall of Van Cott# Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy,
Attorneys
1600,

for Defendant, at

Salt

Lake

December, 1984.

City, Utah

50 South Main
84144,

Street, Suite

on this

^? s?

C:::

28th day of
^W^
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